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Abstract 
  
Disasters may offer a window of opportunity, in which extraordinary circumstances create 
momentum for positive social change. While this potential is popularized through the concept of 
“building back better,” few studies have examined quantitatively the processes and drivers of 
broader social change in a post-disaster context. Using renewable energy transition (specifically, 
solar photovoltaic diffusion) as one measure of building back better, this study explores how 
pre-and post- disaster contexts, capacities, and policies affected recovery outcomes of 30 
coastal communities nearly 5 years following the Great East Japan earthquake, tsunami, and 
nuclear disaster (Tohoku disaster). Our study shows that the disaster-affected communities 
adopted significantly more solar power than the rest of Japan following the introduction of the 
country’s Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) system in 2012. The communities examined are highly diverse in 
their solar energy adoption as of 2015, and regression analysis was conducted to explain 
differences in overall solar energy diffusion as well as in adoption of very large scale mega-solar 
projects. The dynamic relationship between physical damage and subsequent solar adoption 
was found to be nonlinear, as was the relationship between degree of household relocation and 
solar energy adoption. Differences in communities’ mega-solar adoption were also explained by 
the variability in hazard zone designation and extent of physical damage.  These findings 
suggest that a disaster may serve as an opportunity for positive community change when 
immediate impact (or the level of change involved in a reconstruction process) is high enough 
but not overwhelming. Overall, this study finds potentially complex relationships. 
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1. Introduction 
  
         Disasters have long been posited as "windows of opportunity" for change and societal 
improvement, particularly to reduce risk. "Building back better," a term popularized after the 
catastrophic 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, emphasizes the importance of capitalizing on 
opportunities for building resilience in disaster reconstruction. A number of frameworks and 
practical guidelines for "building back better" have since been developed [1]. The Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction [2], among others, emphasizes the importance of 
preparing before a disaster to integrate risk reduction into reconstruction,  recovery and the 
broader sustainability agenda. 
         Disasters enable change for many reasons. For a short period of time, a disaster event 
will bring natural hazard risks to the fore of media, popular, and policy attention. Governments 
are pressured to take action to ensure future safety. Damaged buildings and physical 
infrastructure must be restored, and can be repaired or replaced in ways that reduce 
vulnerability to future hazard events. More generally, disasters upset the status quo and create 
opportunities for new ideas and change. Yet forces for change will also compete against 
pressures to restore disrupted systems as quickly as possible to familiar, pre-disaster conditions. 
Furthermore, pressures to rapidly rebuild communities can lead to hastily designed policies for 
risk reduction that inadvertently serve to aggravate vulnerability. An example is the case of Sri 
Lanka's short-lived coastal buffer zone policy following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami [3]. 
         Research is needed to develop a theoretically informed, empirically sound, and 
contextualized understanding of societal change in disaster recovery. Knowledge is as yet 
sparse regarding the frequency and extent to which change actually occurs following disasters, 
the factors that facilitate or impede change, the processes by which change occurs, and the 
benefits and unintended consequences of deliberate change. 
         This paper investigates change during recovery from the 2011 Great East Japan 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster (Tohoku disaster). Recent studies indicate that this 
catastrophe, while not altering governance systems [4, 5], has triggered substantial change in 
areas such as coastal land-use and the energy sector. Focusing on the latter, this paper 
inquires into the growth in renewable energy sources, particularly solar photovoltaic (PV) 
technology, as a measure of "building back better" in the disaster region. In this disaster, the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant accident greatly accelerated Japan's energy transition toward 
renewable energy sources. Renewable energy was promoted in recovery strategies by all levels 
of government (e.g., [6]). Through a cross-sectional, quantitative analysis of 30 tsunami-affected 
towns and cities, this study examines the degree to which localities were able to capitalize on 
the opportunity for energy transition, as well as factors influencing this change. 
         As a case study, renewable energy is particularly interesting because it represents an 
example of how communities can pursue other societal objectives (e.g., increasing energy 
security, reducing energy costs, reducing greenhouse gas emissions) synergistically with 
disaster recovery and risk reduction. For example, the tsunami-impacted town of 
Higashimatsushima (pop. 40,000), incorporated bold energy changes into its reconstruction plan, 
including turning a flooded park into a 2MW solar PV project and building smaller PV projects 
for emergency power at designated evacuation areas. The town's longer-term plans, pending 
feasibility studies, envision building Japan's first microgrid community, in which a city-owned 
electricity system could autonomously provide power if disconnected from the grid in a future 
disaster [7].  
         This paper is organized as follows. Following a review of the literature on change in 
disaster recovery (Section 2), background for the case study is provided in terms of the disaster 
event itself and the context of energy transition at the national and prefectural levels (Section 3). 
Data for the community-level analysis are described in Section 4 and results presented in 
Section 5. Conclusions (Section 6) summarize findings, implications, limitations, and further 
research needs. 
2. Change in disaster recovery 
  
         Recovery is a rapidly emergingarea of disaster research. Early theories of recovery – 
particularly the influential work of Haas et al. [8] – focused on physical reconstruction and 
conceptualized recovery as a linear, phased sequence of post-disaster activities and outcomes. 
Subsequent critiques have emphasized social recovery and the differentiated, iterative, and 
nonlinear processes and experiences involved, as well as the influence of the broader societal 
context (see [9]). While progress has been made, because recovery research is dominated by 
individual case studies, a unifying theory of recovery remains elusive. 
         Comparative analysis using multiple cases is needed to test causal relationships and 
develop generalized insights to support recovery theory [9~11]. In one recent example, Aldrich 
[12] utilized data on over 30 tsunami-affected cities in Japan to conduct a quantitative analysis 
to explain variations in an index of functional recovery. In this index, developed by the National 
Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), full recovery is indicated by all convenience stores 
reopening, no persons remaining in evacuation shelters, full utility restoration, complete debris 
clearance, etc. The cross-sectional analysis in [12] found that recovery was faster in 
communities with stronger political ties to the central government – an important factor in 
facilitating flows of disaster aid. 
         The issue of change during recovery remains an important gap in the literature. 
Research has increasingly recognized that while recovery may in some cases entail a return to 
pre-disaster conditions, in other cases, systems stabilize at a different, new equilibrium: 
"Recovery may thus be viewed as an adaptive process that negotiates the tensions between re-
establishment of pre-disaster systems and significant alteration of those systems." [9: 127]. 
Change following disturbances is an integral part of resilience theory in the context of social-
ecological systems, yet very few studies have examined change in disaster recovery, and 
methods for investigating change remain poorly developed [13]. Research is needed on what 
kinds of interventions are more effective under various circumstances to enable disaster-
affected communities to achieve positive recovery trajectories [14]. 
         In broad terms, three types of factors have been identified in the literature as influencing 
change during recovery: factors related respectively to actions, capacity, and context. Actions at 
the community scale include pre-disaster planning, which is especially important since speed 
and quality of decision-making are often in conflict during reconstruction and recovery [11, 15]. 
Recovery processes that favor speed over deliberation can be expected to facilitate restoration 
of pre-disaster systems rather than change. Communities that establish recovery committees 
and other participatory, information-sharing forums have a greater tendency to try to change 
negative pre-disaster conditions [16]. 
         Local capacity is also critical for implementing change during recovery. Local 
government capacity, local leadership, and the availability of recovery funding are all important 
[17, 18]. Public participation in post-disaster decision-making processes has also been found to 
promote change during recovery [17~19]. Strong advocacy coalitions can be influential in 
effecting policy change [20]. 
         The scale of the disaster itself may be one of the most important factors influencing 
change. Catastrophic events have been clearly linked to changes in risk-related policies [20, 21] 
and in urban economic and spatial structures [18, 22, 23]. Small shocks that can be managed 
by existing structures and systems may not provide sufficient impetus for change. On the other 
hand, it can be argued that conditions in catastrophic events may overwhelm local capacity to 
such a degree as to impede deliberate efforts for improvement. 
         Finally, studies have shown the importance of the broader societal context for post-
disaster recovery outcomes. Disasters have been found to accelerate prior trends, for example 
of growth or decline, because the underlying system dynamics (e.g., economic competition) 
remain in force after the disaster [8, 10, 14]. It can thus be hypothesized that communities with 
growing populations, younger demographics, and more innovative economic, social, and 
political environments may be more likely to implement post-disaster improvements. Entrenched 
interest groups can impede change (see [11]). The structure of nationally defined disaster 
assistance policies is also important; flexible policies that support local decision-making can 
facilitate change, while top-down, prescriptive policies reinforce the status quo ante [18]. 
         The literature thus suggests through qualitative and case study analysis some of the 
factors that may be important in understanding changes during recovery. This paper 
quantitatively tests the influence of these factors through an analysis of local-level change in 
renewable energy uptake following the Tohoku disaster in Japan. Before doing so, however, it is 
important to set out the context in which these changes have occurred. 
3. Context 
3.1  The Tohoku disaster and national energy policy 
  
         The 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster was a 
catastrophe with long-term local as well as national impacts. According to the National 
Reconstruction Agency (www.reconstruction.go.jp), the disaster led to over 15,000 deaths (with 
another 2,500 missing) and caused 470,000 people to evacuate from their homes. Over 1.1 
million buildings were damaged. Direct economic losses have been estimated at 16.9 trillion yen 
(US$ 199 billion), making it the world's costliest natural disaster on record. Five years after the 
disaster, 174,000 persons remain displaced. Housing reconstruction continues, including 
relocation of residents to upland areas. The reconstruction budget over a 9-year reconstruction 
period is estimated at 32 trillion yen (US$263 billion).    
         The Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster instigated a dramatic transformation in 
Japan's energy sector. On the demand side, conservation measures by both industry and 
households achieved substantial energy savings and averted short-term crises; moreover, some 
of these behavioral changes have persisted for years, well beyond the immediate crisis [24~26].  
         On the supply side, under substantial public pressure, all of the nation's 54 nuclear 
power plants were shut down, with only 2 restarted as of 5 years after the disaster. Prior to the 
disaster, Japan's energy policy had been heavily based in nuclear power, a direction driven by 
energy security concerns from the oil shocks of the 1970s. Indeed, prior to the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster, the national energy strategy had been targeting an increase in the share of 
nuclear power from 30 to 50% by 2030, and there was no effective regulatory framework for 
investment in renewable energy sources [27]. With the shutdown of nuclear capacity, Japan 
became even more dependent on importing fuel (oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and coal), 
which had negative consequences for both the economy [28] and carbon emissions [29]. In 
contrast to the pre-disaster energy policy that strongly emphasized nuclear power and energy 
efficiency [30], the government's post-Fukushima policy incorporated a rapid growth in 
renewable energy sources, with a target of 20% renewables share by the 2020s [28]. 
         The primary policy instrument used was a feed-in-tariff (FIT) that, under discussion prior 
to the disaster, was launched in July 2012. FITs, the most commonly used renewable energy 
policy tool worldwide, provide a guaranteed (usually premium) price and grid access over a 
long-term period for electricity that is generated from renewable sources. Japan's energy policy 
continued to change in the years after the disaster, with FIT rates for solar power being lowered 
and some nuclear capacity being reintroduced into national energy plans [28].  
         Renewable energy capacity has expanded rapidly as a result of the policy change. Since 
the introduction of the FIT in 2012, installed PV capacity has been growing at over 40% per year 
[28, 31]. The vast majority of the renewable energy capacity in Japan is solar photovoltaic (PV), 
comprising distributed PV systems that are connected to the grid. Wind energy lags 
considerably, due to land constraints and grid investment requirements [28] as well as 
resistance from vested interests in the energy sector [27, 30]. As a share of electricity 
production in Japan, renewables grew from 3.0% in 2010 to 5.6% in 2013 [28]. 
         Key challenges to the growth of renewable energy in Japan include transmission and 
grid limitations, cost, land constraints, permitting requirements, and heightened uncertainty due 
to restructuring in the energy sector [28]. The latter is unique to Japan, where the Fukushima 
disaster revealed weaknesses in the system (e.g., the technical inability of major utilities to 
share electricity between regions) and prompted an acceleration of structural reforms. Thus, the 
large-scale introduction of renewables is happening concurrently with deregulation of the energy 
market and dismantling of the vertically integrated, regional utilities that had largely monopolized 
power supply prior to the disaster. 
         Furthermore, the pace of change itself posed challenges, as the capacity of approved 
PV projects soon exceeded the hosting capacity of some electric power utilities. In late 2014, 
several electric utilities suspended accepting further grid connection applications. In the case of 
Tohoku Electric Power Company, approved capacity of the FIT program at the end of 2014 
(10.76 GW) was nearly twice its hosting capacity (5.52 GW) and approached peak summer 
demand (13.6 GW) [31]. Thus, there is currently a lag between approved projects and installed 
capacity for renewables (70.1GW and 15.4GW, nationally), and not all approved projects may 
eventually be installed [31]. 
3.2  Energy transition at the prefectural level 
  
         While published policy analyses of the Japanese energy transition have focused on the 
national level, insights regarding the transition process are also critical at the regional and local 
levels. Energy transition is fundamentally a geographical process in many ways, involving not 
only issues of location and landscape but also territoriality, spatial differentiation, scalability, and 
historic path dependency [32]. The three prefectures most heavily affected by the tsunami 
(Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures) have shown contrasting views towards renewable 
energy transition in their reconstruction plans: while Miyagi emphasized the need for “radical 
reconstruction” and “innovative community development” through deregulation and private 
sector involvement in areas such as eco-town demonstration [1:33], energy independence from 
nuclear power was heralded as one of the primary goals of Fukushima’s reconstruction [34]. 
Iwate’s renewables emphasis was perhaps the least visible, with residents’ safety, rebuilding of 
livelihoods, and local industry promotion being seen as the primary foci of disaster 
reconstruction [35]. At the regional level, differences can be seen between the three prefectures 
and the rest of the country.  
         The tsunami affected regions experienced unprecedented growth in renewable energy 
penetration in the post-disaster years, particularly for solar photovoltaic technology. Growth 
rates matched and in some categories greatly exceeded the national pace of change. Figure 1 
shows the growth in renewable energy approvals on a per capita basis since the introduction of 
the national FIT system in July 2012, by prefecture and energy type. For small-scale solar 
projects (below 10kW), these figures represent a 30-fold (i.e., roughly 3000%) increase in Iwate, 
Miyagi, and the rest of Japan over 3.5 years, and a 25-fold in Fukushima. Approvals for 
medium-sized solar projects (between 10kW and 1,000kW capacity) have increased even more 
dramatically, by more than 330-fold in Iwate, 760-fold in Miyagi, and 5300-fold in Fukushima. 
 
  
Figure 1. Increases in per capita renewable energy approvals, July 2012 to December 2015 
(source: author calculations based on FIT website and Statistics Bureau, various years). 
  
         The contrast between the disaster region and the rest of the country is especially striking 
for mega-solar systems (>1000kW). While 0.26 kW of mega-solar capacity per person had been 
approved in the rest of Japan from the beginning of the FIT program through December 2015, 
approximately 1.5 kW per capita has been approved in the tsunami-affected prefectures (Figure 
1). By way of comparison, 4.5 kW per household of solar installation would be nearly sufficient 
to meet the average annual household electricity consumption of approximately 5,200 kWh in 
Japan [1]. The figures thus indicate an unprecedented rate of solar PV diffusion in the disaster-
affected region. Furthermore, the average scale of approved mega-solar facilities was 
significantly larger in the tsunami-affected areas than in the rest of Japan (Appendix Table A1). 
         Actual installation of renewable energy capacity – particularly mega-solar projects – has 
lagged behind approval capacity. As noted previously, factors include difficulties in securing grid 
connections, along with a wait-and-see attitude on the part of investors. For mega-solar projects, 
actual installation has stalled at approximately 7% and 22% of approved capacity in the tsunami 
affected areas and the rest of Japan, respectively. This contrast sharply with the installation rate 
of above 80% achieved for small-scale solar (below 10kW capacity) throughout Japan. 
Furthermore, the uptake of other renewable energy sources including wind, hydro and 
geothermal remains minimal in both areas. Per capita approval of wind power was on average a 
mere 0.01 kW and 0.009 kW in the tsunami affected prefectures and rest of Japan, respectively. 
For hydro power, the figures are 0.01kW and 0.002kW, and for geothermal, 0.001kW and 
0.0003 kW (see Appendix Table A1). 
         Energy transition occurring at the regional level, therefore, is yet to achieve the scale of 
all-embracing renewable energy transformation. Unlike solar power, which enjoyed decades of 
government largesse prior to the disaster, opposition to wind power continues among Japan’s 
electric power utilities. Geothermal resources, despite their abundance, also remain under-
utilized due to the environmental sensitivity of surrounding areas (the majority of which are in 
national parks). In general, longer and more complex permitting processes along with perceived 
risk of hitherto unused technologies discourage non-solar renewable uptake throughout Japan 
[37]. As a window of opportunity gradually closes, supporting infrastructure and regulatory 
reforms have not kept pace with the post-disaster rhetoric of a renewable energy big bang. 
Responding to these challenges, the Japanese cabinet has recently approved several revisions 
of its FIT policy including more stringent approval processes based on detailed project feasibility 
and auctioning of solar power to encourage the diffusion of non-solar renewable technologies 
[38]. 
         Nonetheless, since large-scale renewable energy investment projects require significant 
mobilization of capital, land, and other resources, it is striking that the disaster-affected regions 
chose to initiate these changes and were able to do so amid complex reconstruction processes. 
This uptake was likely facilitated by numerous national and regional policies, including direct 
subsidy, land use deregulation, and expedited permitting processes that were allowed under 
targeted schemes such as special zones for reconstruction. At the same time, local 
communities’ willingness to embrace change must have played an important role in such 
processes. The local dynamics will be explored further in this paper through quantitative 
analysis. 
4. Methodological Approach 
  
         Energy transition is experienced and enabled locally in different ways. The analysis 
presented below investigates why some communities achieved greater renewable energy 
adoption than others. In the case of Tohoku recovery, because the local communities all faced a 
disaster-driven opportunity for change and were all operating in the context of Japan's national 
energy transition, differences between various localities' experiences are of particular interest 
for clarifying the processes and challenges of "building back better." 
         Local-level analysis in this study focused on 30 coastal municipalities in Iwate, Miyagi, 
and Fukushima prefectures that were affected by the 2011 tsunami (Figure 2). Municipalities 
located in the nuclear evacuation zone in Fukushima were excluded due to the special 
circumstances affecting their recovery. Thus, the dataset includes only three coastal 
communities in Fukushima prefecture: Shinchi, Soma, and Iwaki. Statistical data were gathered 
from government sources and published research papers for the 30 municipalities for various 
periods between 2005 and 2015 (Appendix Table A2). Descriptive statistics for variables in the 
dataset are shown in Table 2. 
  
  
 
Figure 2. Study region. (Blue = localities 
included in analysis; hash pattern = 
Fukushima nuclear evacuation area) 
  
Statistical modeling was conducted to explain variation across the municipalities in 
renewable energy uptake following the disaster. The study focused on solar photovoltaic 
systems since this has been the predominant source of renewable energy adopted in this region. 
As noted previously, solar energy projects are very diverse:  while some 99% consist of small-
scale (<10kW) units, there has also been rapid growth in mega-solar projects in the disaster 
region. Separate analyses were therefore conducted to explore these phenomenon. 
First, diffusion of solar energy was modeled using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression, with the dependent variable being the number of approved solar energy projects per 
capita in each municipality. Municipal-level data were only available for the post-disaster period, 
so it was assumed that the localities had no PV installation prior to 2011; while not entirely 
accurate, this is unlikely to affect the results of the analysis since data available at the 
prefectural level indicate that pre-disaster PV installation was minimal. As noted previously, 
there is a considerable lag between solar energy approvals and installations. The analysis 
therefore focuses on the number of approved projects as a more meaningful indicator of 
intention to engage in post-disaster change. 
Second, mega-solar investment strategy was modeled using binary logistic regression, 
with the dependent variable being whether or not each municipality had approved very large-
scale mega-solar project(s). Although an official definition of mega-solar installation refers to 
projects with a capacity of above 1,000 kW, this study uses 2,000 kW as the cutoff since all but 
three municipalities have adopted some form of mega-solar systems above 1,000 kW. Note that 
the two dependent variables are not statistically correlated, that is, in terms of broad-based solar 
diffusion, communities with mega-solar projects were not notably different from those without 
them. Diffusion and intensive investment thus appear to be distinct processes of change. 
  
  
  
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics of Municipal-Level Data 
  Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Number of approved solar projects per capita .020  .0096 .0072 .047 
Mega-solar above 2,000kW (0 or 1) .53 n.a. 0 1 
Independent Variables 
Context 
Population change between 2005-2010 (%) -4.30 4.10 -9.38 6.51 
Nuclear subsidy ( 0 or 1) .1 n.a. 0 1 
Change in fiscal capacity* between 2008-2010 
(%) 
-4.21 4.88  -18.0 6.90 
Capacity 
Fiscal capacity*  .493 .265 .13 1.28 
Adaptive capacity (waste recycling rate as a 
proxy) 
17.8  6.02  9.60 36.5 
Social capital (suicide rate per 100,000 
residents as a proxy) 
28.8 23.7 0 126 
Physical damage (% of houses destroyed]) 37.3 38.2 .037  120** 
Action 
Relocation (% of households) 4.22 4.63 0 13.9 
Recovery period (years) 8.03 2.09 5  10 
Prior renewable energy plan (0 or 1) .467 n.a. 0 1 
Designated tsunami risk area (sq km)  4.38 5.67 0 19.5 
Note: * Fiscal capacity index takes a value of 0-100, calculated as a 3-year average ratio of reference fiscal 
revenue over demand; ** calculated as the total number of houses destroyed divided by the pre-disaster 
number of households reported. Due to different data sources used for these quantities, some communities 
have calculated physical damage of above 100%.    
 
         In both sets of analyses, a similar set of explanatory variables was utilized. The severity 
of the disaster as experienced locally is perhaps the factor of greatest interest. All else equal, a 
more severe shock (as measured by physical damage) is expected to create a greater impetus 
and opportunity for change in recovery. The percentage of population being relocated to higher 
ground similarly indicates the severity of the disaster and extent of post-disaster change, but 
more directly reflects the reconstruction burden on local governments. In order to capture 
expected nonlinear effects of these factors, the squared terms are also included in the 
regression models. 
  As suggested by the literature reviewed in Section 2 above, other independent variables 
are also included that capture pre- and post-disaster actions, capacities, and context. The 
existence of a pre-disaster plan, in this case for renewable energy, is also expected to have a 
positive influence on post-disaster change. The recovery period indicated in municipalities’ 
reconstruction and recovery plans provides a measure of orientation toward speed versus 
deliberation in recovery. Greater local capacity is expected to enhance post-disaster renewable 
energy adoption; capacity variables include the local government’s pre-disaster fiscal capacity, 
community adaptive capacity (measured using rate of waste recycling as a proxy), and 
community social capital (measured negatively, using rate of suicidal deaths as a proxy). 
Contextual variables include the pre-disaster rates of change for population and for fiscal 
capacity; both are expected to have a positive influence on the dependent variables. Prior to the 
disaster, some localities had accepted subsidies as compensation for nuclear power plant 
locations and can be expected to have less interest in (i.e., a negative influence on) shifting 
toward renewable energy sources. In addition to variables shown in Table 2, two prefectural 
dummy variables are included to capture other policy and contextual variables operating at that 
scale. Finally, one variable was included only in the logistic regression: designated tsunami risk 
area was used as a measure of land availability, which was hypothesized to affect the uptake of 
mega solar projects (which require large tracts of vacant land), but not the overall diffusion of 
solar PV (which consists overwhelmingly of small-scale projects).   
As shown in Table 2, the 30 municipalities are remarkably diverse. Many communities 
have shared common challenges of aging population, declining economy and fiscal positions 
prior to the 2011 disaster, but have suffered different extent of physical damage. Communities 
have also shown divergent views over speed versus deliberation of their reconstruction 
processes and over the extent to which they perceived the promotion of renewable energy to be 
an integral part of ‘building back better.’ Of 30 communities examined in our study, 16 have 
adopted mega-solar above 2,000kW. The number of solar projects approved per capita ranges 
from 0.0072 to 0.047 with the mean of 0.02. In general, the functional recovery of community 
infrastructure proceeded in parallel with the progress of energy transition. These two processes 
are not entirely identical, however: the degree of change measured in terms of  per capita 
approval of solar units shows low correlation (r=0.41) with basic infrastructure and functional 
recovery as measured with the NIRA Index (using the latest compiled data as of December 
2012) [39].    
5. Results 
Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients for OLS regression models explaining the 
broad-based diffusion of solar PV technology, measured in terms of the per capita number of 
approved units. Models I and II represent the full models and differ only in the variable used to 
measure scale of disaster (in Model I, population relocating to higher ground; in Model II, 
physical damage). As expected, higher physical damage and more households relocating were 
positively related to greater solar adoption; however, the effect was offset at extreme levels of 
damage, when communities faced competing resource demands for larger and more complex 
relocation projects. These findings combined speak to the potential for the disasters – up to a 
point – to break communities' 'business-as-usual' modes of operation, providing an impetus for 
positive social change. 
Results in Table 3 also indicate that other factors in the communities’ contexts, 
capacities, and actions also seem to matter. Communities with higher population growth prior to 
the disaster were better able to facilitate greater energy transition. The two prefectural dummy 
variables were statistically significant, indicating that prefectural-level policy and environment 
also seem to play a role. Counter-intuitively, communities with less fiscal capacity and with no 
prior renewable energy plans actually experienced wider adoption of solar technology. Negative 
and statistically significant relationships found regarding fiscal capacity and prior renewable 
energy plan may indicate that the broad-scale diffusion of solar power experienced thus far is 
not a top-down and planning-oriented diffusion, but is instead a self-organized or market-
oriented diffusion triggered by the national policy change of FIT introduction.       
Other variables were not statistically significant in the models. Policy variables such as 
prior existence of nuclear power plants (i.e., acceptance of nuclear subsidies) and community 
capacity variables such as prevalent adaptive capacity, measured in terms of waste recycling 
rate as a proxy, and (the lack of) social capital, measured in terms of the rate of suicidal deaths, 
were also insignificant. Broad-based solar diffusion took place regardless of whether 
communities chose faster versus slower reconstruction processes. Re-estimating the models 
without these insignificant variables (reported as reduced models in Table 3) does not change 
the major findings, and improves the models slightly. 
 Overall, the models have very high explanatory power, explaining more than 80% of the 
variation in per capita solar approvals. Regression diagnostics indicate the models do not suffer 
from significant multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, or spatial autocorrelation.  
  
Table 3 Estimated OLS regression coefficients (unstandardized) 
  Model I Model II Model I-Reduced Model II-Reduced 
  DV: # of approved 
unit 
DV: # of approved 
unit 
DV: # of approved 
unit 
DV: # of approved unit 
Context 
Population change .00069 **  .00086 ** .00044  .00072**  
Nuclear subsidy .00027  .00061     
Change in fiscal 
capacity 
 -.00034  -.00015     
Capacity 
Fiscal capacity -.0206***   -.023** 
 
-.018*** -.019 *** 
 
Adaptive capacity  .00015 
 
.000078    
Social Capital  -.000026  -.000059     
Physical Damage   .00025**   .00021*** 
Physical Damage^2   -0.00000014*  -0.00000011*** 
Action 
Relocation  .0020**   .0018 **   
Relocation ^2 -.00012*    -.000092   
Recovery period  -.00046 -.00084     
Prior renewable 
energy plan 
 -.0058*** -.0058*** -.0068 ***   -.0061*** 
Prefecture dummy 
(Miyagi) 
.0057 ** .0058 ** .0057** .0061** 
Prefecture dummy 
(Fukushima) 
 .025***   .027*** .025***  .028*** 
constant  .027 ***  .033*** .025***  
 
.025*** 
Adjusted R^2  0.80  0.809 0.809 0.82 
F  10.9***  11.2*** 18.5*** 20.3*** 
Mean VIF  5.17  5.23 6.12 5.16 
White’s test statistic 30  30  26.5 27.0 
Moran’s I -0.00013 0.0157 0.1087 0.0679 
Sample size 30 30 30 30 
 Note: Significance levels: *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
  
Table 4 summarizes results from the logistic regressions, which model the 
likelihood of communities engaging in very large mega-solar projects. As before, Models 
III and IV represent the full models and differ only in the variable used to measure scale 
of disaster. In contrast to diffusion of small-scale solar projects, adoption of these large-
scale, complex investments may require mobilizing substantially more human and 
financial resources and addressing issues of public acceptance. They may thus create 
competing demand for resources and time in already capacity-constrained 
reconstruction processes. This expectation is corroborated by results in Table 4, which 
indicate that while a wider designation of disaster risk areas opened up further 
opportunities (i.e., land) for mega-solar systems, communities undergoing larger 
household relocation projects (or experiencing greater damage) were nevertheless 
unlikely to opt for such options. In contrast to the OLS regressions, the scale of the 
disaster has a negative influence on change, and no other variables are statistically 
significant. The models overall are statistically significant at the 5% level or better, and 
re-estimating the logistic models without the insignificant variables does not materially 
change the findings. 
  
Table 4.  Estimated logistic regression coefficients (log-odds ratios) 
  Model III Model IV Model III-reduced Model IV-reduced 
  DV: 1= mega solar, 
0=no mega solar 
DV: 1= mega solar, 
0=no mega solar 
DV: 1= mega solar, 
0=no mega solar 
DV: 1= mega solar, 
0=no mega solar 
Context 
Population 
change 
 .203  
 
  .015 
 
    
Nuclear subsidy   3.33 
 
  7.03      
  
Change in fiscal 
capacity 
.026 .030     
Capacity 
Fiscal capacity   -3.81  -5.80     
Adaptive 
capacity 
 -.044 
 
  .052     
Social Capital -.113 -.286 
 
    
Physical    -.162*    -.0757 ** 
Damage 
Action 
Relocation  -.479**     -.314**   
Recovery period  -.567 
 
  -.830 
  
    
Prior renewable 
energy plan 
 1.26  1.56     
Designated 
tsunami risk 
area 
 .236 * .715* 
 
.158* 
 
 .313 ** 
 
constant 11.6 *   17.8 
 
.660 
 
  1.25* 
 
Pseudo R^2 0.46  0.58 0.22 0.37 
LR chi2  19.2**  24.1*** 9.09** 15.5*** 
Moran’s I  -0.0492  -0.0292  -0.0182 -0.0758 
Sample size 30 30 30 30 
Note: Significance levels: *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
6. Conclusions 
While the notion of “building back better” has become commonplace in the 
lexicon of reconstruction efforts globally, disaster recovery is still rarely measured 
beyond the speed and extent of return to pre-disaster conditions, and few studies have 
quantitatively examined the processes and drivers of broader social change in the 
context of post-disaster recovery. To shed light on this topic, this study used the status 
of energy transition as one example of such social change and examined its primary 
drivers in cross-sectional analysis of 30 communities recovering from tsunami in the 
Tohoku region of Japan. The study contributes both methodological and empirical 
insights on the “window of opportunity” for community betterment during disaster 
recovery. Several observations can be made. 
First, measuring change in terms of “building back better” is complex. Traditional 
measures of recovery, including efforts to monitor recovery progress over time [39,40], 
typically consider statistical indicators that refer to pre-disaster levels. Examples include 
percent of utility service restored, population as a percent of pre-disaster levels, and 
percent of damaged housing that is rebuilt. Measuring change is more complex, as it 
requires differentiation between types of change for which appropriate measures may 
differ. In this study, broad-based diffusion of small-scale solar PV was better captured 
by per capita counts of solar projects, while more intensive, singular mega-solar 
projects were more appropriately considered with a binary measure. 
Second, results from this study provide evidence that while disasters do create 
opportunities for change, the degree to which communities capitalize on the opportunity 
depends on many factors. The scale of the disaster is important, exerting a nonlinear 
influence on solar energy diffusion (i.e., facilitating change, but only up to a point) but a 
negative influence on (i.e., impeding) intensive mega-solar investments. Aside from 
scale of disaster, factors explaining diffused change differed from those explaining 
intensive investment. One possible explanation may be that the processes are very 
different, with diffusion drawing on the decentralized initiative of many actors and 
intensive change particularly requiring the attention and resources of local government. 
In general, community preferences toward mega-solar projects are harder to identify 
with the variables explored in this study, and factors such as external influence may 
play a larger role. 
A particularly interesting issue is the degree to which efforts towards risk 
reduction in recovery may constrain improvements towards other societal objectives, in 
this case, transition towards more renewable energy. Given that the designation of 
disaster risk areas is closely linked to nationally determined tsunami safety guidelines 
(which also served as a prerequisite for publically supported relocation projects), the 
potentially competing and cross-scale nature of safety versus wider community 
betterment found in our analysis deserves further reflection. 
Third, findings from this study point to the importance of cross-scale interactions 
in bringing about change. The Fukushima nuclear accident instigated sweeping change 
in Japan’s national energy sector, including introducing the FIT mechanism for 
promoting investment in renewable energy, deregulating markets, and dismantling 
vertically integrated utilities. These national changes in energy policy created an 
environment that encouraged change at the local level. At the same time, local efforts 
also encountered barriers to renewable energy adoption from higher levels, such as 
constraints in the national grid infrastructure and ambiguity regarding the country’s 
energy future. Unless these are resolved, wider and more tangible uptake of renewable 
energy is unlikely to occur, and there is little that communities can do to address these 
issues. 
The lessons drawn from our study are highly relevant for designing effective 
disaster reconstruction policy: when communities and nations seek to “build back better,” 
it is important to think beyond return to the pre-disaster normal, identifying potential 
cross-scale barriers and enablers for positive changes and developing workable 
strategies accordingly. Such processes should ideally take place before the next major 
disaster. As indicated in this study, disaster reconstruction processes are complex, and 
the pursuit of one objective may come at the cost of another. 
Further study is needed to clarify these complexities and to test the wider 
applicability of the findings in this study. The cross-sectional, quantitative analysis 
indicated that prefectural differences were influential, and that characteristics of local 
planning processes were not (or may even have impeded change). Furthermore, both 
physical damage and relocation had a non-linear relationship with solar diffusion, which 
remains open to alternative interpretations. These puzzles should be further explored 
through in-depth, qualitative case study. Such investigation may clarify such important 
aspects as the role of funding sources for the renewable energy investments (e.g., local 
vs. external capital), the role of national, prefectural and local policies, winners and 
losers, and the qualitative or hidden factors influencing the processes of change.   
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Appendix 1. Prefectural Statistics 
  
Appendix Table A1. Number of approved projects and average capacity of renewables, July 
2012 to December 2015 (source: author calculations based on FIT website) 
Type of Renewables Iwate Miyagi Fukushima Rest of 
Japan 
Solar <10kW # approved (per 
1,000 persons) 
8.3 10.8 11.8 7.3 
Average capacity 
(kW/unit) 
4.6 4.4 4.6 4.5 
Solar >10 kW 
& <1000kW 
# approved (per 
1,000 persons) 
5.8 5.8 11.3 6.6 
Average capacity 
(kW/unit) 
46.9 
 
45.8 
 
41.5 
 
41.2 
 
Megasolar 
>1000kw 
# approved (per 
1,000 persons) 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Average capacity 
(kW/unit) 
9,562.1 
 
7,105.9 
 
7,556.8 
 
3,685.3 
 
Wind # approved (per 
1,000 persons) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Average capacity 
(kW/unit) 
5992.1 
 
372.8 
 
2924.7 
 
5305.6 
 
Hydro # approved (per 
1,000 persons) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Average capacity 
(kW/unit) 
2,035.9 
 
32.5 
 
2,578.6 
 
1,650.5 
 
Geothermal # approved (per 
1,000 persons) 
0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
Average capacity 
(kW/unit) 
7,499.0 
 
n.a. 400.0 
 
1,224.4 
 
  
  
Appendix 2. Data Sources 
  
Variables Years (and 
months where 
applicable) 
Sources 
Prefectural-Level 
Renewable energy 
approval 
July 2012- 
December 
2015 
FIT website http://www.fit.go.jp/statistics/public_sp.html 
Population 2012-2014* Statistical Bureau of Japan STATISTICAL 
OBSERVATIONS OF PREFECTURES 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/k-sugata/gaiyou.htm 
Municipal-Level 
Renewable energy 
approval 
2015 Statistical Bureau of Japan STATISTICAL 
OBSERVATIONS OF SHI，KU，MACHI，MURA 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/s-sugata/index.htm 
Population 2005, 2010 Statistical Bureau of Japan STATISTICAL 
OBSERVATIONS OF SHI，KU，MACHI，MURA 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/s-sugata/index.htm 
Land areas 2013 Statistical Bureau of Japan STATISTICAL 
OBSERVATIONS OF SHI，KU，MACHI，MURA 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/s-sugata/index.htm 
Fiscal capacity 2008-2010 Statistical Bureau of Japan STATISTICAL 
OBSERVATIONS OF SHI，KU，MACHI，MURA 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/s-sugata/index.htm 
Adaptive capacity 
(rate of waste 
recycle as proxy) 
2010 Statistical Bureau of Japan STATISTICAL 
OBSERVATIONS OF SHI，KU，MACHI，MURA 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/s-sugata/index.htm 
Social capital (rate 
of suicidal death 
as proxy) 
2009-2010 Cabinet office database on suicidal deaths in Japan 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/jisatsutaisaku/toukei/index.html 
  
Physical Damage 2011 Cabinet office database on Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami 
http://www.stat.go.jp/info/shinsai/ 
  
Recovery planning 2011 [41] 
Relocation Various years [42] 
Prior energy plan Various years [43] 
Nuclear siting 
subsidy 
2010 [44] 
Tsunami risk areas 2014 [45] 
Note: *latest available year was used instead of 2015. 
  
 
 
 
[1]  Assumes an average household size of 3 persons. Annual system production capacity is 
estimated as approximately 1,000 kWh/kW assuming a panel angle of 30 degrees facing south 
[36]. 
  
 
